Researchers are just beginning to explore household survey micro-data containing information about private transfers for Eastern European countries.
Part of the reason for this vacuum in policy discussions concerns availability of data. The principal objective of this paper is to fill this gap by analyzing the Household Budget Survey (HBS) for Poland. Prior information suggests that private transfers are likely to figure prominently in the Polish system of safety nets and poverty alleviation.
First, existing studies, conducted by both ourselves and others, indicate that private transfers are often large and responsive to economic and demographic variables.
3 For example, private transfers flow from rich to poor, just as in public tax-and-transfer systems. And increases in recipient pre-transfer income often prompt reductions in private
transfers, mirroring what happens in the public sector with means-tested social insurance programs. Further, private transfers are usually targeted to vulnerable groups such as the young, the elderly, female-headed households, and those stricken by illness, unemployment or those facing income instability.
Another reason to believe that private safety nets are especially important in Poland has to do with the country's turbulent history. War, occupation and partitions are likely to have raised the value of family ties as coping mechanisms (Worach-Kardas [1983] ). And there is emerging evidence that the formation of habits and traditions are important elements in family interaction, so that a history of hardship may have strengthened the cultural norms that facilitate private transfers. Poland's homogeneity of religious beliefs probably encouraged close family networks as well.
Indeed, the limited available evidence concerning private transfer and intergenerational relations in Poland points to strong ties between generations. For example, two-thirds of all elderly persons in Poland live with their children, which attests to the importance of private transfers in the form of shared living arrangements. And for all forms of care (e.g., caring for the sick, child care, help with errands and personal 3 business) private familial sources are an order of magnitude more prevalent than professional sources (Worach-Kardas [1983] ).
The need to understand the social and economic factors shaping private transfers--with special attention to their relationship to other forms of assistance--is justified by the increasing role of the private safety net for coping with economic hardship during the period of transition. A recent opinion survey ) indicates that fully one-quarter of Polish households regard help from relatives and friends as important for their standard of living. 4 According to a sociological survey conducted by GUS in January 1993, 28 percent received support from other households: in-kind (19 percent); cash (10 percent);
service/help (7 percent); other forms (e.g., "life advice," 9 percent). 5 The substantial duration of this assistance also matters: three-quarters of the recipient households have received at least one of these forms of assistance over a period of a year and a half. A similar proportion of households reported a significant impact on their well being from cash, non-cash or in-kind help from non-household family members. The major needs experienced by recipients--equivalently, the reasons that motivated donors--are associated with recipients' inability to cope with housing problems (21 percent could not afford to pay rent), lack of a job or job uncertainty (18 percent), and food needs (18 percent). Further, the safety net provided by other institutions is far from comprehensive. According to the same study, an estimated one-third of households in Poland requiring financial support, and a fifth of households needing in-kind help, did not receive help from the state, church or charitable organizations. This finding highlights the importance of family networks for economic reform.
Further, Poland's chronic shortages prior to economic transition--felt most dramatically during the period of martial law (1981-84)--may have spurred the development of informal trading networks, which in turn strengthen the bonds needed to facilitate inter-household risk-sharing. Shortages likely encourage inter-household trade. If one household cannot obtain soap and another is short of meat, the two might be able to 4 improve their lot by trading. Trading experience could help forge the bonds of altruism and trust necessary for households to engage in risk-sharing behavior by making financial transfers.
In the next section we discuss the data for financial and in-kind private transfers.
Then we describe the incidence and size of transfers and the characteristics of givers and recipients, from which we will infer whether private transfers tend to perform some of the functions of public transfers. This will be followed by a section that develops an empirical framework to address the critical policy question: to what extent do private transfers affect the incidence and effectiveness of publicly-funded safety nets?
DATA SOURCES
The data used in the analysis come from the nationwide Household Budget Survey (HBS), conducted annually by Poland's Central Statistical Office (GUS) since 1957.
Different households were surveyed each quarter using a diary, i.e., a budget notebook typically completed by a female homemaker, as a collection instrument. Two-thirds of the households were re-surveyed in the corresponding quarter over the period of four years.
The remaining third enter the study for just one quarter and are replaced in the following year.
The In 1992, the HBS was continued on a smaller sample that had entered the survey in 1990.
As in 1987, it was a nationwide representative survey but only covered about 11,000
households.
The advantages and limitations of the HBS for measuring the economic status of households, and for monitoring the impact of economic reform on the population, are discussed in a comparative perspective (with the Hungarian Income Survey and the Czechoslovak Social Stratification Survey) in Garner, Okrasa, Smeeding and Torrey (1991) . 8 The primary strength of the HBS is that it is designed to provide the most comprehensive and timely picture of a household's material status. Nevertheless, its pre-1992 versions (such as the 1987 HBS, used in this study) do have some drawbacks, the most important of which relate to coverage and to the non-response rate.
The sample covers the non-institutional population of households whose heads belong to one of the above socio-economic groups. Excluded are households headed by someone employed in the private sector (5.6 percent of employees in 1986); persons employed in the defense and security ministries (3.1 percent before 1989); and nomenclatura (less than 1 percent). 9 Altogether, 10.5 to 11.5 percent of the population were not covered by the HBS in 1987. There is also no information about income from outside the legal/official economy. These activities were not as significant in 1987 as they were in later years. Private transfers received and given are constructed from detailed questions about income and expenditures. Cash receipts are reported directly in the income section of the questionnaire that summarizes, for the entire (quarterly) period of the study, information registered in the household's "budget-notebook," or diary. Non-monetary receipts are reported in the expenditure section of the same questionnaire as "commodities or services obtained free of charge." The quantity and value of each item is specified--the latter is estimated by both the interviewer and household, at current market prices. Thus, the category "gifts received" encompasses money, goods and services. Receipts also include bequests, dowry payments, and the value of goods received from persons living abroad.
In addition, support from private non-familial sources such as charity income is included in private transfer receipts. Total transfers given equal money and the value of goods given to persons outside the household, including relatives separated from the family for at least three months (e.g., a dormitory resident).
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Because of the inclusion of transfers from abroad, bequests and charity income in receipts but not gifts, measures of transfers received and transfers given are not symmetric.
Transfers given include both money and the value of goods given to persons not belonging in the household, including relatives living separately from the family for at least three months (e.g., a student living in a dormitory).
EMPIRICAL WORK
We now turn to a description of private transfer magnitudes and patterns and results from a policy simulation. Before proceeding to the details of the empirical work, we summarize our main findings. Private transfers appear to flow from high-to low-income households. The preprivate-transfer income is lowest for net recipients and highest for net givers (table 1) .
Recipients have lower average social-transfer income than givers.
Those involved with private transfers are better educated than those who are not.
Over 12 percent of net recipients and 13 percent of net givers attended a university, for example, compared to less than 10 percent of "others" (table 1) . Recipients are younger, and givers older, than the sample average. Over 19 percent of recipient households were headed by someone under 30, compared to 10 percent of giver households. Further, the elderly (those aged 60 and over) are under-represented among recipients and overrepresented among givers. (Though, in this sample of employees, they are a small minority overall.) Similarly, there are relatively fewer pensioners among recipients compared to givers. So it appears that transfers flow from old to young among these nonfarm, employed households. We stress, however, that our results pertain to the sample of households headed by those employed in the state sector, rather than the overall household population. Recipients had slightly more frequent illness or injury requiring hospitalization during the 3-month period of the survey, compared to the whole sample. But households with invalids are under-represented among recipients.
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The unconditional means in table 1 provide an introductory illustration of transfer patterns. We now turn to a multivariate analysis of transfer incidence and amounts.
B. Specification of Transfer Functions
We estimate transfer functions in two stages: first we consider the incidence of transfers (the transfer decision) and, conditional on a transfer occurring, the amount. In symbols,
indexing households by h, we express the latent variable that determines the transfer receipt as 
where η h is a random error component.
i. Household Resources
Household resources are measured by three forms of income: wages and salaries, social security income and income from other social support. We also enter educational attainment of the head of the household as an indicator for household permanent income.
ii. Age
We enter a quadratic in the age of the household head, as well as interacting age with income. If transfers are responsive to liquidity constraints, we would expect that timing of transfers would be important. Transfer incidence and amounts would be concentrated in life-cycle phases when current resources are low.
iii. Demographic Characteristics
We enter a vector of other household demographic characteristics: gender of the household head, marital status, and family size. Many studies indicate that transfers are targeted to female-headed households (for a review of the evidence, see Cox and Jimenez [1995] ). Marital status has also been found to be an important determinant of transfers (Cox [1987] ). And, holding household resources constant, we might expect more transfers to be targeted to larger families, since there would be more mouths to feed. We also include a dummy indicating whether there are pensioners present in the household, and one indicating whether there are elderly persons (aged 60 or over) but no pensioners.
On the one hand, we might expect transfers to be targeted to the retired, though since this group is also collecting a pension, which could crowd out private transfers.
iv. Other Variables
We include two health indicators in the transfer functions. The first is a dummy indicating whether a household member was injured or sick enough to require hospitalization during the 3 month period of the survey. The second dummy indicates whether one or more persons in the household were collecting a disability pension. If households form co-insurance networks we might expect transfers to respond positively to the incidence of illness. We also enter dummy variables for whether the household has a telephone and a car. If having either of these enables a household to perform more interhousehold, in-kind services or have increased contact with relatives and friends we would expect them to be positively associated with private transfers.
C. Table 2--Probit Results for Net Transfer Receipts
Probit results for net transfer receipts are presented in Private transfers follow a pronounced age pattern over the life-cycle, suggesting that they may be responsive to possible liquidity constraints faced by younger households, who
may not yet have established their reputations in formal credit markets. At sample means, a household headed by an 18 year-old has a predicted probability of receiving a transfer of 51 percent. This probability falls continuously with age, to about 19 percent by age 73
(chart 2). Further, the coefficient of the "young couple" dummy variable indicates that such households are about 11 percentage points more likely than other households to receive a transfer.
CHARTS 1 AND 2 AROUND HERE
Households having a member who was hospitalized are more likely to receive a transfer--having illness or injury raises the probability of transfer receipt by 3.3 percentage points. Similarly, households with someone classified as an "invalid" (i.e., a person who qualifies for disability benefits) is 6.1 percentage points more likely to receive a transfer.
Unlike the pattern prevailing in many other countries, private transfers do not appear to be targeted to female-headed households. Households headed by women are 1.3 percentage points less likely to receive (but the coefficient is not statistically significant). Part of the reason for the difference in patterns between Poland and, say, the Philippines or Peru, is that these latter countries are poorer and the disparity in well-being between male and female-headed households is likely to be more pronounced.
Being married reduces the probability of transfer receipt by 4.5 percentage points, but larger families are more likely to receive. All else equal a family of 7 is 1.4 percentage points more likely to receive a transfer than a family of 2. Households with a pension beneficiary are less likely to receive transfers (7 percentage points).
While this evidence suggests that private transfers compensate for low incomes and other difficult situations, other findings from column 1, Cox (1990) 
D. Generalized Tobit--Transfer Recipients
The generalized Tobit for transfer recipients is presented in the second column of 
E. Giving Behavior
The probit and generalized Tobit estimates for transfers given are shown in table 3.
The probit estimates indicate that increasing earnings from 40,000 zlotys to 70,000 zlotys increases the probability of giving a transfer by 11 percentage points. Again, the logarithmic specification implies that the partial impact of earnings on the probability of giving diminishes as the level of earnings rises.
An increase in social security income from 0 to the sample mean increases the probability of giving by 6.0 percentage points. Social support income have negligible effects on giving behavior (table 3, columns 1 and 2). The partial effect of earnings on the probability of giving declines with age, though its effect is not statistically significant.
The probability of giving also increases with education, which presumably reflects wealth effects. Those who have attended high school, "occupational" school, or university each have a higher probability of giving than the reference category, those with an elementary school education or less. For example, all else equal, attending university instead of just elementary school adds 5.2 percentage points to the predicted probability of giving a transfer.
TABLE 3 AROUND HERE
The probability of giving follows a pronounced age pattern. At sample means, the predicted probability of giving continually rises from 16 percent at age 18 to 37 percent at age 70. Part of the age pattern could be determined by the number of dependents living outside of the household, which would vary with age of the household head.
Demographic patterns for the probability of giving tend to mirror those for receiving. For example, young couples are 4.1 percentage points less likely to give.
Family size exerts a strong negative effect on the probability of giving. With the rest of the variables at sample means, a household with two members has a predicted probability of giving of 32 percent. One with 7 members has a predicted probability of only 10 percent.
F. A Simulation of the Effects of Job Loss on Transfers
This section addresses the following question: If the household head had a reduction in earnings, how would private transfers respond? The question is important because we would like to gauge the extent and magnitude of private safety nets available for households who lose their jobs as Poland makes the transition from a socialist to capitalist economy. The stronger the private safety nets, the lesser the scope for effective redistribution through public income transfers. At the same time, extrapolating from the 1987 cross-section could be problematic because the transfer function need not be stable throughout the transition. For this reason, we also examine post-transition transfer behavior in the next section.
We find that, on average, predicted private transfer receipts would increase by 133 percent if the household head lost his/her earnings. The boost in private transfers would fill about 11 percent of the income vacuum left by the job loss, though the effect varies greatly depending on whether there is only one earner in the household. So private transfers, while not availing households of complete insurance against job loss, could fill a substantial portion of the income gap caused by such losses.
We calculated the predicted probability of transfer receipt and transfer amount after setting the earnings of the household head equal to zero. So earnings of the first earner are subtracted from the pre-transfer income in the simulation.
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The results from the simulation are outlined below: Earnings replacement for single-worker households is higher in part because our specification implies that the transfer effects of earnings are greater in absolute value the lower are earnings.
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The boost in private transfers prompted by the earnings loss of the head of the household makes up for nearly 11 percent of lost income for the sample as a whole. For households with only one worker, this figure is 22 percent. So private transfers can replace a significant fraction of income in the event that an earner loses his or her job. The simulation shows that private safety nets were potentially important in Poland prior to the transition.
There are three final ideas to keep in mind concerning the simulation. First, it is a partial equilibrium exercise. We assume that one household experiences joblessness but the others do not. Since earnings loss is not widespread other households do not lose their capacity to give transfers. 20 If a significant fraction of households lost their earnings at once, private safety nets could dry up rather than expand.
Second, the HBS does not link donors and recipients. Since donor incomes cannot be included in the regressions for private transfer receipts, coefficient estimates of the recipient income variables could be biased toward zero. Omitted variable bias renders our simulations conservative. The reason is that donor's income is likely to enter positively in the transfer regressions, and we would expect that incomes of donors and recipients are likely to be positively correlated. 21 Taking into account the possibility that our results could be affected by omitted variable bias strengthens our conclusions that private transfers are a potentially important safety net in Poland.
Third, we must examine transfer behavior during the post-transition regime to get an accurate picture of the stability of the transfer functions through the transition. We turn our attention to a replication of the analyses above using the HBS data for 1992.
RESULTS FROM THE 1992 SURVEY
We replicated the 1987 results using the 1992 HBS. The replication of Because transfer receipts fell in 1992, and the responsiveness of transfers to pretransfer income weakened as well, our simulation of the impact of job loss on transfer receipts generated a much weaker impact than the simulation with the 1987 data. We found that private transfers would only fill 2.5 percent of the gap left by removing the earnings of the head (compared to 11 percent for the 1987 data). And for single-earner households, the comparable figure in 1992 is 3.6 percent (versus 22 percent in 1987).
The probit and generalized Tobit equations for transfers given in 1992 are presented in table 6. The probit results (column 1) follow the same pattern with respect to pretransfer income as the 1987 results, except that the impact of education on the probability of giving a transfer was negative in 1992, though the result is not statistically significant.
As with transfers received, transfers given became less responsive to pre-transfer income in 1992. The elasticity of amounts given with respect to pre-transfer income (at sample means) was less than half as large in 1992 as in 1987 (0.70 versus 1.59).
CONCLUSION
Private transfers are responsive to the economic status of households in a way that suggests they could be an important factor in ensuring the safety net during Poland's economic transition. Our simulation with 1987 data of the response of private transfers to loss of earnings of the household head indicates that a substantial fraction of lost income could be replaced by a boost in private transfers--up to 22 percent of lost earnings for households with only one worker.
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Over the two time periods for which data were available (1987 and 1992) the transfer functions appear quite stable. The primary difference is that transfer amounts (both receipts and gifts) appear less responsive to pre-transfer income in 1992 compared to 1987. However, the private transfer amounts were much lower in 1992 than in 1987. This may indicate that, with imperfect capital markets, the ability of inter-household networks to cushion shocks is weaker, since most households were affected simultaneously by economic downturns.
Two of us have conducted related research for Russia (Cox, Eser and Jimenez [1995] ) and we find many patterns similar to those found here. Using Russian household survey data for 1992 and 1993, we find that private transfers help equalize the distribution of income and prevent poverty. Notably, the worsening economic conditions in Russia in 1993 were associated with a one-third falloff in private transfer amounts, though the incidence of private transfers attenuated only slightly. Thus, the pattern for Russia tends to corroborate the findings in this paper. Finding out why the private safety net appears to fray somewhat in the face of increased economic hardship in these countries is an important priority for future research. 2. Private income redistribution has been the topic of recent research for both developed countries and developing countries. See, for example, the surveys by Gale and Scholz (1994) and Cox and Jimenez (1990) .
3 . See, for example, the studies reviewed in Cox and Jimenez (1990) . (Table 2 ) and giving (Table 3 ) uses a step, rather than a quadratic, function for age: age<30, age≥60, and 10-year intervals in-between. These probit equations produce estimated partial derivatives similar to their counterparts in tables 2 and 3. We experimented with an alternative way to identify the generalized Tobit by adding the following terms to the probit used to generate the inverse Mill's ratio: a cubic term in age and interactions between age and marital status, family size and the female headship and young-couple dummies. This generalized Tobit produced results similar to the ones presented above, as did an OLS regression using the non-limit observations. 1 8. Those households for whom earnings were greater than pre-transfer income (1.7 percent of the sample) and those for whom earnings of the first earner are the sole source 25 of support for the household were deleted from these simulations. The total deletion: 3.1 percent of the sample. The reason for deleting those who relied solely on earnings for support is that in the log specification the predictions become extreme at very low values of pre-transfer income. Table 5 Probit and Generalized Tobit --Net Transfers Received, 1992 Source: Net Transfer Receipt Probit. 
